Internationaaal

Nationaal

 

∆ Internationaal

 

We live in a globalising world, with expanding transports of goods and people, and the vector-borne diseases they carry can with them. Some people (even politicians) say these transports can (or should) not be hindered, because of  the so-called freedom of trade.  They think we must accept the risk of introduction of invasive organisms, that have the potential to carry and spread vector-borne diseases. That viewpoint  is wrong.

 

There are several international agreements that imply that Member states should set restrictions on the import and export of vector-borne diseases, because of risks for the health of humans, animals and plants, and because of risks for the biodiversity:

-the Convention on biological diversity (CBD)

-the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)

-the standards of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)

-the International Health Regulations (IHR)

 

And the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has made trade agreements that make these restrictions possible:

- agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)

- agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phitosanitary Measures (SPS)

 

∆ Convention on biological diversity (CBD)

The international agreement that is the most comprehensive on the subject of the introduction of alien species is the Convention on biological diversity (CBD). It states that each contracting party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, prevent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species (art. 8 sub h). The Conference of the Parties (COP) advances implementation of the Convention through the decisions it takes at its periodic meetings.

The COP has recognized that there is an urgent need to address the impact of invasive alien species (IAS), and has adopted Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species (decision VI/23).

 

The Guiding principles:

1. Precautionary approach

2. Three-stage hierarchical approach

3. Ecosystem approach

4. The role of States

5. Research and monitoring

6. Education and public awareness

7. Border control and quarantine measures

8. Exchange of information

9. Cooperation, including capacity-building

10. Intentional introduction

11. Unintentional introductions

12. Mitigation of impacts

13. Eradication

14. Containment

15. Control

 

Guiding principle 1: Precautionary approach

Given the unpredictability of the pathways and impacts on biological diversity of invasive alien species, efforts to identify and prevent unintentional introductions as well as decisions concerning intentional introductions should be based on the precautionary approach, in particular with reference to risk analysis, in accordance with the guiding principles below. The precautionary approach should also be applied when considering eradication, containment and control measures in relation to alien species that have become established. Lack of scientific certainty about the various implications of an invasion should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take appropriate eradication, containment and control measures.

 

Guiding principle 2: Three-stage hierarchical approach

Prevention is generally far more cost-effective and environmentally desirable than measures taken following introduction and establishment of an invasive alien species.

· Priority should be given to preventing the introduction of invasive alien species, between and within States.

· If an invasive alien species has been introduced, early detection and rapid action are crucial to prevent its establishment. The preferred response is often to eradicate the organisms as soon as possible.

· In the event that eradication is not feasible or resources are not available for its eradication, containment and long-term control measures should be implemented.

Any examination of benefits and costs (environmental, economic and social) should be done on a long-term basis.

 

Guiding principle 3: Ecosystem approach

Measures to deal with invasive alien species should, as appropriate, be based on the ecosystem approach (described in decision V/6 of the Conference of the Parties).

 

Guiding principle 4: The role of States

In the context of invasive alien species, States should recognize the risk that activities within their jurisdiction or control may pose to other States as a potential source of invasive alien species, and should take appropriate individual and cooperative actions to minimize that risk, including the provision of any available information on invasive behaviour or invasive potential of a species.

Examples of such activities include:

· The intentional transfer of an invasive alien species to another State (even if it is harmless in the State of origin); and

· The intentional introduction of an alien species into their own State if there is a risk of that species subsequently spreading (with or without a human vector) into another State and becoming invasive;

· Activities that may lead to unintentional introductions, even where the introduced species is harmless in the state of origin.

To help States minimize the spread and impact of invasive alien species, States should identify, as far as possible, species that could become invasive and make such information available to other States.

 

Guiding principle 5: Research and monitoring

In order to develop an adequate knowledge base to address the problem, it is important that States undertake research on and monitoring of invasive alien species, as appropriate. These efforts should attempt to include a baseline taxonomic study of biodiversity. In addition to these data, monitoring is the key to early detection of new invasive alien species. Monitoring should include both targeted and general surveys, and benefit from the involvement of other sectors, including local communities.

Research on an invasive alien species should include a thorough identification of the invasive species and should document:

(a) the history and ecology of invasion (origin, pathways and time-period);

(b) the biological characteristics of the invasive alien species; and

(c) the associated impacts at the ecosystem, species and genetic level and also social and economic impacts, and how they change over time.

 

Guiding principle 6: Education and public awareness

Raising the public's awareness of the invasive alien species is crucial to the successful management of invasive alien species. Therefore, it is important that States should promote education and public awareness of the causes of invasion and the risks associated with the introduction of alien species. When mitigation measures are required, education and public-awareness-oriented programmes should be set in motion so as to engage local communities and appropriate sector groups in support of such measures.

 

Guiding principle 7: Border control and quarantine measures

States should implement border controls and quarantine measures for alien species that are or could become invasive to ensure that:

· Intentional introductions of alien species are subject to appropriate authorization;

· Unintentional or unauthorized introductions of alien species are minimized.

States should consider putting in place appropriate measures to control introductions of invasive alien species within the State according to national legislation and policies where they exist.

These measures should be based on a risk analysis of the threats posed by alien species and their potential pathways of entry. Existing appropriate governmental agencies or authorities should be strengthened and broadened as necessary, and staff should be properly trained to implement these measures. Early detection systems and regional and international coordination are essential to prevention.

 

Guiding principle 8: Exchange of information

States should assist in the development of an inventory and synthesis of relevant databases, including taxonomic and specimen databases, and the development of information systems and an interoperable distributed network of databases for compilation and dissemination of information on alien species for use in the context of any prevention, introduction, monitoring and mitigation activities. This information should include incident lists, potential threats to neighbouring countries, information on taxonomy, ecology and genetics of invasive alien species and on control methods, whenever available. The wide dissemination of this information, as well as national, regional and international guidelines, procedures and recommendations such as those being compiled by the Global Invasive Species Programme should also be facilitated through, inter alia, the clearing-house mechanism of the Convention on Biological Diversity.

The States should provide all relevant information on their specific import requirements for alien species, in particular those that have already been identified as invasive, and make this information available to other States.

 

Guiding principle 9: Cooperation, including capacity-building

Depending on the situation, a State's response might be purely internal (within the country), or may require a cooperative effort between two or more countries. Such efforts may include:

· Programmes developed to share information on invasive alien species, their potential uneasiness and invasion pathways, with a particular emphasis on cooperation among neighbouring countries, between trading partners, and among countries with similar ecosystems and histories of invasion. Particular attention should be paid where trading partners have similar environments;

· Agreements between countries, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, should be developed and used to regulate trade in certain alien species, with a focus on particularly damaging invasive species;

· Support for capacity-building programmes for States that lack the expertise and resources, including financial, to assess and reduce the risks and to mitigate the effects when introduction and establishment of alien species has taken place. Such capacity-building may involve technology transfer and the development of training programmes;

· Cooperative research efforts and funding efforts toward the identification, prevention, early detection, monitoring and control of invasive alien species.

 

Guiding principle 10: Intentional introduction

No first-time intentional introduction or subsequent introductions of an alien species already invasive or potentially invasive within a country should take place without prior authorization from a competent authority of the recipient State(s). An appropriate risk analysis, which may include an environmental impact assessment, should be carried out as part of the evaluation process before coming to a decision on whether or not to authorize a proposed introduction to the country or to new ecological regions within a country. States should make all efforts to permit only those species that are unlikely to threaten biological diversity. The burden of proof that a proposed introduction is unlikely to threaten biological diversity should be with the proposer of the introduction or be assigned as appropriate by the recipient State. Authorization of an introduction may, where appropriate, be accompanied by conditions (e.g., preparation of a mitigation plan, monitoring procedures, payment for assessment and management, or containment requirements).

Decisions concerning intentional introductions should be based on the precautionary approach, including within a risk analysis framework.

Where there is a threat of reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of sufficient scientific certainty and knowledge regarding an alien species should not prevent a competent authority from taking a decision with regard to the intentional introduction of such alien species to prevent the spread and adverse impact of invasive alien species.

 

Guiding principle 11: Unintentional introductions

All States should have in place provisions to address unintentional introductions (or intentional introductions that have become established and invasive). These could include statutory and regulatory measures and establishment or strengthening of institutions and agencies with appropriate responsibilities. Operational resources should be sufficient to allow for rapid and effective action.

Common pathways leading to unintentional introductions need to be identified and appropriate provisions to minimize such introductions should be in place. Sectoral activities, such as fisheries, agriculture, forestry, horticulture, shipping (including the discharge of ballast waters), ground and air transportation, construction projects, landscaping, aquaculture including ornamental aquaculture, tourism, the pet industry and game-farming, are often pathways for unintentional introductions. Environmental impact assessment of such activities should address the risk of unintentional introduction of invasive alien species. Wherever appropriate, a risk analysis of the unintentional introduction of invasive alien species should be conducted for these pathways.

 

Guiding principle 12: Mitigation of impacts

Once the establishment of an invasive alien species has been detected, States, individually and cooperatively, should take appropriate steps such as eradication, containment and control, to mitigate adverse effects. Techniques used for eradication, containment or control should be safe to humans, the environment and agriculture as well as ethically acceptable to stakeholders in the areas affected by the invasive alien species. Mitigation measures should take place in the earliest possible stage of invasion, on the basis of the precautionary approach. Consistent with national policy or legislation, an individual or entity responsible for the introduction of invasive alien species should bear the costs of control measures and biological diversity restoration where it is established that they failed to comply with the national laws and regulations. Hence, early detection of new introductions of potentially or known invasive alien species is important, and needs to be combined with the capacity to take rapid follow-up action.

 

Guiding principle 13: Eradication

Where it is feasible, eradication is often the best course of action to deal with the introduction and establishment of invasive alien species. The best opportunity for eradicating invasive alien species is in the early stages of invasion, when populations are small and localized; hence, early detection systems focused on high-risk entry points can be critically useful while post-eradication monitoring may be necessary. Community support is often essential to achieve success in eradication work, and is particularly effective when developed through consultation. Consideration should also be given to secondary effects on biological diversity.

 

Guiding principle 14: Containment

When eradication is not appropriate, limiting the spread (containment) of invasive alien species is often an appropriate strategy in cases where the range of the organisms or of a population is small enough to make such efforts feasible. Regular monitoring is essential and needs to be linked with quick action to eradicate any new outbreaks.

 

Guiding principle 15: Control

Control measures should focus on reducing the damage caused as well as reducing the number of the invasive alien species. Effective control will often rely on a range of integrated management techniques, including mechanical control, chemical control, biological control and habitat management, implemented according to existing national regulations and international codes.

 

Closing the gaps

At COP 7 (2004), it was decided that “specific gaps in the international regulatory frameworks at global, regional and national levels persist, notably in relation to species that are invasive, but do not qualify as plant pests under the regulations of international agreements”, with regard to the following pathways:

· The use of non-native organisms in aquaculture and the restocking of marine and inland water systems for commercial and recreational fisheries taking into account contributions of national codes, and voluntary international efforts such as Codes of Practice on the Introductions and Transfers of Marine Organisms developed by the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas and the FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries;

· Unintentional or opportunistic introductions (e.g., "hitchhiker organisms"), including through hull-fouling, packaging material, import consignments, vehicular transport and other means;

· Unintentional introductions of invasive alien species through international assistance and humanitarian programmes, tourism, military, scientific research, cultural and other activities;

· Intentional introductions of alien species for non-food purposes, including certain aspects of horticulture and trade in pets and aquarium species;

· Intentional introduction of alien species, as biocontrol agents for control or eradication of invasive alien species, pests or weeds;

· Transnational and national ex situ breeding projects with alien species as sources for intentional or unintentional introduction;

· Intentional introduction of invasive alien species through international assistance programmes, including conservation and development projects and other activities;

· Intentional introduction of potentially invasive alien species through international incentives schemes; and

· Introduction of alien species through aquaculture escapes, bait and pet releases, water transfer schemes.

The decision of COP 8 (VIII/27) identified measures by which Parties, other governments, relevant organizations and the Executive Secretary should address identified pathways for invasive alien species.

The work on invasive alien species under the Convention will be reviewed in-depth at COP 9 in 2008.

 

∆ International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)

 

The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is an international treaty to secure action to prevent the spread and introduction of pests of plants and plant products, and to promote appropriate measures for their control. It is governed by the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures (CPM) which adopts International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs).

 

In the IPPC, “Pest” is defined as:  any species, strain or biotype of plant, animal or pathogenic agent injurious to plants or plant products.

 

One of the most relevant ISPMs in relation to invasive species is ISPM no. 11: PEST RISK ANALYSIS FOR QUARANTINE PESTS INCLUDING ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND LIVING MODIFIED ORGANISMS (2004)

 

In this ISPM it is stated that the full range of pests covered by the IPPC extends beyond pests directly affecting cultivated plants. The coverage of the IPPC definition of plant pests includes weeds and other species that have indirect effects on plants, and the Convention applies to the protection of wild flora. The scope of the IPPC also extends to organisms which are pests because they:

- directly affect uncultivated/unmanaged plants

Introduction of these pests may have few commercial consequences, and therefore they have been less likely to be evaluated, regulated and/or placed under official control. An example of this type of pest is Dutch elm disease (Ophiostoma novo-ulmi).

- indirectly affect plants

In addition to pests that directly affect host plants, there are those, like most weeds/invasive plants, which affect plants primarily by other processes such as competition (e.g. for cultivated plants: Canada thistle (Cirsium arvense) [weed of agricultural crops], or for uncultivated/unmanaged plants: Purple loosestrife (Lythrum salicaria) [competitor in natural

and semi-natural habitats]).

- indirectly affect plants through effects on other organisms

Some pests may primarily affect other organisms, but thereby cause deleterious effects on plant species, or plant health in habitats or ecosystems. Examples include parasites of beneficial organisms, such as biological control agents.

To protect the environment and biological diversity without creating disguised barriers to trade, environmental risks and risks to biological diversity should be analyzed in a PRA.

The standard provides details for the conduct of pest risk analysis (PRA) to determine if pests are quarantine pests. It describes the integrated processes to be used for risk assessment as well as the selection of risk management options.

 

ISPM no. 11 also includes details regarding the analysis of risks of plant pests to the environment and biological diversity, including those risks affecting uncultivated/unmanaged plants, wild flora, habitats and ecosystems contained in the PRA area.

 

For identification and characterization of the indirect effects of the pest in the PRA area, or those effects that are not host-specific, the following are examples that could be considered:

- effects on domestic and export markets, including in particular effects on export market access. The potential consequences for market access which may result if the pest becomes established, should be estimated. This involves considering the extent of any phytosanitary regulations imposed (or likely to be imposed) by trading partners

- changes to producer costs or input demands, including control costs

- changes to domestic or foreign consumer demand for a product resulting from quality changes

- environmental and other undesired effects of control measures

- feasibility and cost of eradication or containment

- capacity to act as a vector for other pests

- resources needed for additional research and advice

- social and other effects (e.g. tourism).

 

In the case of the analysis of environmental risks, examples of indirect pest effects on plants and/or their environmental consequences that could be considered include:

- significant effects on plant communities

- significant effects on designated environmentally sensitive or protected areas

- significant change in ecological processes and the structure, stability or processes of an ecosystem (including

further effects on plant species, erosion, water table changes, increased fire hazard, nutrient cycling, etc.)

- effects on human use (e.g. water quality, recreational uses, tourism, animal grazing, hunting, fishing); and

- costs of environmental restoration.

 

Effects on human and animal health (e.g. toxicity, allergenicity), water tables, tourism, etc. could also be considered, as appropriate, by other agencies/authorities.

 

 

∆ World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)

 

The need to fight animal diseases at global level led to the creation of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE). In May 2003 the Office became the World Organisation for Animal Health but kept its historical acronym OIE. The OIE is the intergovernmental organisation responsible for improving animal health worldwide.

 

Each Member Country undertakes to report the animal diseases that it detects on its territory. The OIE then disseminates the information to other countries, which can take the necessary preventive action. This information also includes diseases transmissible to humans and intentional introduction of pathogens. Information is sent out immediately or periodically depending on the seriousness of the disease. This objective applies to disease occurences both naturally occuring and deliberately caused.

 

The OIE collects and analyses the latest scientific information on animal disease control. This information is then made available to the Member Countries to help them to improve the methods used to control and eradicate these diseases. Guidelines are prepared by the network of about 200 OIE Collaborating Centres and Reference Laboratories across the world.

 

The OIE provides technical support to Member Countries requesting assistance with animal disease control and eradication operations, including diseases transmissible to humans.

 

The OIE develops normative documents relating to rules that Member Countries can use to protect themselves from the introduction of diseases and pathogens, without setting up unjustified sanitary barriers. The main normative works produced by the OIE are: the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, the Aquatic Animal Health Code and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals.

 

The Veterinary Services and laboratories of developing and transition countries are in urgent need of support to provide them with the necessary infrastructure, resources and capacities that will enable their countries to benefit more fully from the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS Agreement) while at the same time providing greater protection for animal health and public health and reducing the threat for other countries which are free of diseases.
The OIE considers the Veterinary Services as a Global Public Good and their bringing into line with international standards (structure, organisation, resources, capacities, role of paraprofessionals) as a public investment priority.

 

The OIE Member Countries have decided to provide a better guarantee of the safety of food of animal origin by creating greater synergy between the activities of the OIE and those of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. The OIE's standard-setting activities in this field focus on eliminating potential hazards existing prior to the slaughter of animals or the primary processing of their products (meat, milk, eggs, etc.) that could be a source of risk for consumers.

 

∆ International Health Regulations (IHR)

 

The IHR (2005) have entered into force on 15 June 2007.

In June 2007, the world will start implementing the International Health Regulations (2005). This legally-binding agreement will significantly contribute to international public health security by providing a new framework for the coordination of the management of events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concerns, and will improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify and respond to public health threats.

Countries that are States Parties to the Regulations will have two years to assess their capacity and develop national action plans followed by three years to meet the requirements of the Regulations regarding their national surveillance and response systems as well as the requirements at designated airports, ports and certain ground crossings.

 

Ten things you need to know about the IHR (2005)

1. Purpose, scope and principles

2. Concepts and approaches

3. Shared realities require a move towards collective defences

4. Rejections and reservations

5. Notification and other reporting requirements

6. International event detection, joint assessment and response

7. PHEIC determination and temporary recommendations

8. National surveillance and response capacities

9. Public health security in international travel and transport

10. New and updated health documents

 

1. Purpose, scope and principles

The International Health Regulations (2005) or "IHR (2005)" or "the Regulations" are a legally binding agreement among WHO Member States and other States that have agreed to be bound by them (States Parties). The IHR (2005) define their "purpose and scope" as: "to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade". As of 15 June 2007, the provisions of these Regulations will direct and govern particular WHO and States Parties activities aiming to protect the global community from public health risks and emergencies that cross international borders.

These activities are implemented in ways that are consistent with other international law and agreements; their implementation must "be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedom of persons" and "guided by the goal of their universal application for the protection of all people of the world from the international spread of disease".

 

2. Concepts and approaches

The IHR (2005) are purposely broad and inclusive in respect of the public health event to which they have application in order to maximize the probability that all such events that could have serious international consequences are identified early and promptly reported by States Parties to WHO for assessment. The Regulations aim to provide a legal frame work for the prevention, detection and containment of public health risks at source, before they spread across borders, through the collaborative actions of States Parties and WHO.

Notification is required under IHR (2005) for all "events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern". In this regard, the broad new definitions of "event", "disease" and "public health risk" in the IHR (2005) are the building blocks of the surveillance obligations for States Parties and WHO. "Disease" means "an illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans". The term "event" is broadly defined as "a manifestation of disease or an occurrence that creates a potential for disease". "Public health risk" refers to "a likelihood of an event that may affect adversely the health of human populations, with an emphasis on one which may spread internationally or may present a serious and direct danger". A public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) is defined as "an extraordinary event which is determined to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and to potentially require a coordinated international response". Consequently, events of potential international concern, which require States Parties to notify WHO, can extend beyond communicable diseases and arise from any origin or source.

The IHR (2005) explicitly allow WHO to take into account information from sources other than official notifications and consultations, and, after assessment, to seek verification of specific events from the concerned States Parties. Notification to WHO marks the beginning of a dialogue between the notifying State Party and WHO on further event assessment, potential investigation and any appropriate local or global public health response.

The responsibility for implementing the IHR (2005) rests jointly with States Parties and WHO. In order to be able to notify events, or respond to public health risks and emergencies, States Parties must have the capacity to detect such events through a well established national surveillance and response infrastructure. States Parties are required to collaborate actively with each other, together with WHO, to mobilize the financial resources to facilitate the implementation of their obligations under the IHR (2005). Upon request, WHO will assist developing countries in mobilizing financial resources and providing technical support needed to build, strengthen and maintain the required capacities provided for in the Regulations.

 

3. Shared realities require a move towards collective defences

The recognition that globalisation brings with it new challenges and opportunities for preventing the international spread of disease was the starting point for the revision of the International Health Regulations (1969) or "IHR (1969)". In 2003, the outbreak and eventual control of SARS convinced the world's governments of the necessity for a collective and coordinated defence against emerging public health threats, providing the impetus needed to complete the revision process. The newly-revised IHR (2005) were adopted by the Health Assembly on 23 May 2005, and entered into force on 15 June 2007.

The IHR (2005) introduce a legal framework to support existing and innovative approaches in the global detection of events and response to public health risks and emergencies. Though the IHR (2005) were built in part on the foundations of their predecessor, the IHR (1969), they are primarily based on the recent experiences of WHO and its Member States in national surveillance systems, epidemic intelligence, verification, risk assessment, outbreak alert, and coordination of international response, all of which are part of WHO’s decade-long work to enhance international public health security.

The IHR (1969) were limited to the notification of cases of cholera, plague and yellow fever and WHO's actions under the old Regulations depended on receiving official notifications of cases from an affected country. They had little in them that fostered collaboration between WHO and a State Party in which outbreaks of disease with the potential to spread internationally were occurring. They provided primarily for the implementation of specified maximum measures in response to outbreaks of the above-mentioned diseases.

In contrast, the IHR (2005) have a broad scope, provide for the use of a wide range of information and emphasize collaborative actions between States Parties and WHO in the identification and assessment of events and response to public health risks and emergencies. In WHO's coordination of the international response to public health emergencies of international concern, maximum measures are replaced by formally recommended and context-specific temporary health measures, tailored to the actual threat faced.

 

4. Rejections and reservations

The IHR (2005) are legally binding following their entry into force on 15 June 2007 for all WHO Member States that neither rejected them nor filed reservations thereto by the 15 December 2006 deadline. In actual fact, no Member State notified a rejection and only two Member States notified reservations to the Director-General of WHO. Article 62 of the IHR (2005) provides that reservations shall not be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Regulations and that other Member States have the opportunity to object to such reservations. Unless one third of WHO's Member States object to a reservation within six months from the date of notification of the reservation by the Director-General to all Member States, the IHR (2005) will enter into force for the reserving State with the reservation considered accepted. Should one third or more of the Member States submit objections to a reservation, the Director-General will notify the reserving State of the non-acceptance and ask it to consider withdrawing the reservation within three months of this notification. In the case that the reserving State does not withdraw the reservation within this timeframe, the matter would come before the World Health Assembly (WHA) for decision. If the WHA objects, by a majority vote, to the reservation, the reservation is not accepted. In that case, the IHR (2005) do not enter into force for the reserving State unless and until it withdraws the whole or part of the reservation by notifying the Director-General.

 

5. Notification and other reporting requirements

The IHR (2005) describe key elements of the procedures to be followed by States Parties and WHO in terms of information sharing with regard to notified events. Official event-related communications under the IHR (2005) are carried out between the National IHR Focal Point and the WHO IHR Contact Point, both of whom are officially designated and required to be available on a 24 hour basis, 7 days a week. Guidance for the designation or establishment of National IHR Focal Points, including terms of reference and an explanation of principal functions, is provided in the National IHR Focal Point Guide.

The IHR (2005) specify three ways in which States Parties can initiate event-related communications with WHO:

Notification - The IHR (2005) provide new notification requirements for State Parties. These provisions move away from the automatic notification and publication by WHO of cases of specific diseases to the notification to WHO of all events that are assessed as possibly constituting a PHEIC, taking into account the context in which an event occurs. These notifications must occur within 24 hours of assessment by the country using the decision instrument provided in Annex 2 of the IHR (2005). This decision instrument identifies four criteria that States Parties must follow in their assessment of events within their territories and their decision as to whether an event is notifiable to WHO:

1. Is the public health impact of the event serious?
2. Is the event unusual or unexpected?
3. Is there a significant risk of international spread?
4. Is there a significant risk of international restriction(s) to travel and trade?

Notifications must be followed by ongoing communication of detailed public health information on the event, including, where possible, case definition, laboratory results, source and type of the risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of the disease and the health measures employed.

Consultation - In cases where the State Party is unable to complete a definitive assessment with the decision instrument in Annex 2, State Parties have an explicit option of initiating confidential consultations with WHO and seeking advice on evaluation, assessment and appropriate health measures to be taken.

Other Reports - State Parties must inform WHO through the National IHR Focal Point within 24 hours of receipt of evidence of a public health risk identified outside their territory that may cause international disease spread, as manifested by imported or exported human cases, vectors which carry infection or contamination, or by contaminated goods.

In addition to these three types of communications, States Parties are required under the IHR (2005) to respond to WHO Requests for Verification. WHO has an express mandate to obtain verification from States Parties concerning unofficial reports or communications, received from various sources, about events arising within their territories which may constitute a PHEIC; these reports are initially reviewed by WHO prior to the issuing of a verification request. States Parties must acknowledge verification requests by WHO within 24 hours and provide public health information on the status of the event, followed, in a timely manner, by continued communication of accurate and sufficiently detailed public health information available to the notifying State Party.

 

6. International event detection, joint assessment and response

The IHR (2005) underpin WHO’s mandate to manage the international response to acute public health events and risks, including public health emergencies of international concern. The Regulations also recognize WHO's general surveillance obligations, and set out specific procedures for concerned States Parties and WHO to collaborate in the assessment and control of public health events and risks, even before such events have been officially notified to WHO.

At the international level, WHO’s real-time analysis of public health events uses technical knowledge, an understanding of the situational and operational context, and risk communication requirements to assess public health risks in accordance with WHO’s mandate under the IHR (2005). To further strengthen international alert and response capabilities, an enhanced event-management system and standard operating procedures have been developed by WHO. This web-based tool functions as the official repository of all information relevant to an event that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. It facilitates communications within WHO, with National IHR Focal Points, with technical institutions and partners, and provides timely public health information for the management of these events and risks.

Information relating to public health risks notified or reported under the IHR (2005) to WHO is jointly assessed with the affected State Party to ascertain the nature and extent of the risk, the potential for international disease spread and interference with travel and trade, and appropriate response and containment strategies.

 

7. PHEIC determination and temporary recommendations

If immediate global action is needed to provide a public health response to prevent or control the international spread of disease, the IHR (2005) give the Director-General of WHO the authority to determine that the event constitutes a PHEIC. On such occasions, an IHR Emergency Committee will provide its views to the Director-General on temporary recommendations on the most appropriate and necessary public health measures to respond to the emergency.

In cases where the State Party concerned may not agree that a PHEIC is occurring, the Emergency Committee will also provide advice. The temporary recommendations issued by the Director-General are for affected and non-affected States Parties in order to prevent or reduce the international spread of disease and avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic.

 

8. National surveillance and response capacities

Another fundamental innovation in the IHR (2005) is the obligation for all States Parties to develop, strengthen and maintain core public health capacities for surveillance and response. In order to be able to detect, assess, notify and report events and respond to public health risks and emergencies of international concern, States Parties must meet the requirements described in Annex 1A of the IHR (2005). Annex 1A outlines these core capacities at the local (community), intermediate and national levels, including, at the national level, the assessment of all reports of urgent events within 48 hours and the immediate reporting to WHO through the National IHR Focal Point, when required.

The IHR (2005) require each State Party, with the support of WHO, to meet the core surveillance and response capacity requirements "as soon as possible", but not later than five years after the date of entry into force1 for that country. The IHR (2005) set out a two-phase process to assist States Parties to plan for the implementation of their public health capacity obligations. In the first phase, from 15 June 2007 to 15 June 2009, States Parties must assess the ability of their existing national structures and resources to meet the core surveillance and response capacity requirements. This assessment must lead to the development and implementation of national plans of action. As specified in the IHR (2005), WHO will support these assessments and provide guidance on the national planning and implementation of these capacity strengthening plans.

In the second phase from 15 June 2009 to 15 June 2012, the national action plans are expected to be implemented by each State Party to ensure that core capacities are present and functioning throughout the country and/or its relevant territories. States Parties that experience difficulties in implementing their plans may request an additional two year period until 15 June 2014 to meet their Annex 1A obligations. On the basis of a justified need, an extension of two years may be obtained. In exceptional circumstances, and supported by a new implementation plan, the Director-General of WHO may grant an individual State Party a further extension not exceeding two years to meet its obligations.

 

9. Public health security in international travel and transport

International points of entry, whether by land, sea or air, provide an opportunity to apply health measures to prevent international spread of disease. For this reason, many of the provisions addressing this aspect in the IHR (1969) have been updated in the IHR (2005). A number of new provisions have been included. When applying IHR-related health measures to international travellers, for example, it is required that they be treated with courtesy and respect, taking into consideration their gender, sociocultural, ethnic and religious concerns. They must be supplied with appropriate food, water, accommodation and medical treatment if quarantined, isolated or otherwise subject to medical or public health measures under the IHR (2005).

States Parties are required to designate the international airports and ports and any ground crossings which will develop specific capacities in the application of the public health measures required to manage a variety of public health risks. These capacities include access to appropriate medical services (with diagnostic facilities), services for the transport of ill persons, trained personnel to inspect ships, aircraft and other conveyances, maintenance of a healthy environment as well as ensuring plans and facilities to apply emergency measures such as quarantine.

 

10. New and updated health documents

The IHR (2005) require immediate implementation of a range of new or revised health documents at points of entry. Countries need to move quickly to introduce these new health documents into their daily operations.

Model Ship Sanitation Control Exemption Certificate/Ship Sanitation Control Certificate
The Ship Sanitation Control Exemption Certificate/Ship Sanitation Control Certificate replaces the narrower in scope Deratting/Deratting Exemption Certificate as from 15 June 2007. A Deratting/Deratting Exemption Certificate issued before 15 June 2007 is valid for six months only, and, in any case will no longer be valid after 14 December 2007.

Model Maritime Declaration of Health

The Maritime Declaration of Health has been updated to reflect the broader scope of the IHR (2005) and currently accepted technical standards and terminology.

Model International Certificate of Vaccination or Prophylaxis replaces the International Certificate of Vaccination or Revaccination against Yellow Fever

Yellow fever remains the only disease specifically designated under the IHR (2005) for which proof of vaccination or prophylaxis may be required for travellers as a condition of entry to a State. The international certificate has been revised as follows: as from 15 June 2007, the current “International certificate of vaccination or revaccination against yellow fever” is replaced by the “International certificate of vaccination or prophylaxis”. Clinicians who will issue the certificate should note that the main difference from the old certificate is that they have to specify in writing in the space provided that the disease for which the certificate is issued is “yellow fever”. The new certificate no longer contains references to a designated vaccination centre.

Health Part of the Aircraft General Declaration

This is a document of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency. The document is periodically reviewed by ICAO Member States, and has historically, for practical purposes, been reproduced in the annexes of the IHR. Consequently, the recent amendments to this Declaration adopted by ICAO will be reproduced in future editions of the IHR (2005).

 

 

∆ World Trade Organisation (WTO)

 

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business.

Relevant WTO-agreements on the subject of alien invasive species are:

-the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)

-the agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phitosanitary Measures (SPS).

 

∆ WTO-agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)

 

 

Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a

view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.

Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products.

The agreement contains rules on the preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations.

Whenever a relevant international standard does not exist or the technical content of a proposed technical regulation is not in accordance with the technical content of relevant international standards, and if the technical regulation may have a significant effect on trade of other Members, Members shall:

· publish a notice in a publication at an early appropriate stage, in such a manner as to enable interested parties in other Members to become acquainted with it, that they propose to introduce a particular technical regulation;

· notify other Members through the Secretariat of the products to be covered by the proposed technical regulation, together with a brief indication of its objective and rationale. Such notifications shall take place at an early appropriate stage, when amendments can still be introduced and comments taken into account;

· upon request, provide to other Members particulars or copies of the proposed technical regulation and, whenever possible, identify the parts which in substance deviate from

· relevant international standards;

· without discrimination, allow reasonable time for other Members to make comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take these written comments and the results of these discussions into account.

 

These steps may be  omitted where urgent problems of safety, health, environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to arise for a Member. In that case  the Member, upon adoption of a technical regulation, shall:

· notify immediately other Members through the Secretariat of the particular technical regulation and the products covered, with a brief indication of the objective and the rationale of the technical regulation, including the nature of the urgent problems;

· upon request, provide other Members with copies of the technical regulation;

· without discrimination, allow other Members to present their comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take these written comments and the results of these discussions into account.

 

For example, based on art. 2.10 of the TBT, the Dutch government notified a covenant on the import of lucky bamboo (Dracaena sanderiana). In the notification it was stated that is was possible that article 2 of the Covenant and the Annex contained technical regulations. In the notification the interest that was to be protected by this technical regulations was: public health. (http://www.bis.org.in/sf/feb2007/gtbtn07NLD73.doc)

In the notification this was not specified in more detail, but in 2005 Tiger mosquitoes (Aedes albopictus) were discovered in containers with lucky bamboo that were imported from China. Tiger mosquitoes are a big nuisance and a very competent vector of 22 viruses such as Dengue, WEE, EEE, VEE, WNV, Chicungunya en Japanese encephalitis.   

 

∆ WTO-agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)

 

Sanitary or phytosanitary measure is defined  as any measure applied:

(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying

organisms or disease-causing organisms;

(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;

(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or

(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.

 

Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.

 

In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.

 

Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.

 

As in the TBT, the SPS has two notification procedures (normal and fast).

 

For example, based on the SPS, Brazil notified import requirements for Dracaena sanderiana (Lucky Bamboo) imported into Brazil from Chinese Taipei.

(www.ipfsaph.net/cds_upload/kopool_data/WTOSPSNF_0/en_nbra82.doc)

The import requirements stipulate the requirements for documentation, phytosanitary certification and additional declarations to the phytosanitary certificate, inspection and testing, and post-entry quarantine. As objective and rationale was stated:  plant protection.

As international standard, guideline or recommendation was mentioned: International Plant Protection Convention and  Pest Risk Analysis for Quarantine Pests – ISPM 11 (May 2001).

The document containing the background and the measures is written in Portuguese and quite difficult to find, because the link doesn’t function anymore.

It could be possible that these import requirements have a relation with the Tiger mosquito.

Brazil already has problems with this mosquito, and it is to be expected they didn’t want  the introduction of new ones.

 

 

∆ Nationaal

 

Nog in bewerking

 

Flora- en Faunawet

Visserijwet

Plantenziektenwet

Warenwet

Wet milieubeheer

...